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Abstract: We provide a new, simple mechanism for why a monetary policy fails and, 
consequently, produce a long stagnation accompanied by low interest rates. The base 
models we use to explain this mechanism are an IS-LM model and the IS-MP model 
constructed by Romer (2000, 2013). We construct dynamic versions of the base models, 
which possess adaptive adjustments for expected income. We incorporate two types of 
pessimism into the dynamic models: the pessimism in the initial condition and the 
(intended or unintended) pessimistic mode embedded in the models. We consider the 
situation where a monetary policy is implemented for the country to recover from a low 
economic situation. Then, we focus on the transition processes from the old equilibrium, 
existing before implementing the monetary policy, to the new equilibrium after 
implementing it. In considering these, we assume that the equilibria in the models are 
globally asymptotically stable. As a result of the combined effect of two types of 
pessimism, the economy may fall into a long stagnation accompanied by quite low 
interest rate. Moreover, since such pessimisms produce the long stagnation, our result 
exhibits a self-fulfilling prophesy. Therefore, if such pessimisms are not removed, the 
long stagnation may worsen and the quite low interest rates may persist for a long time. 
A remarkable feature of our result is that, even if demand-side fundamentals such as 
investment and consumption functions are not changed, the long stagnation we consider 
emerges merely from pessimism. In this sense, our result gives a new perspective 
concerning the source of a long stagnation. 
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Pessimisms; Long Stagnation with Low Interest Rates; Self-Fulfilling Prophesy 
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1. Introduction 
   
     It has been well-known that when the economy falls into a liquidity trap, it is 
possible that a monetary policy will be ineffective. This mechanism is intuitively 
explained by considering the situation that the intersection of the IS curve and the LM 
curve falls into the liquidity trap of the LM curve. Because of this mechanism, we have 
often experienced the case where, despite the implementation of a monetary policy, the 
economy cannot recover from the stagnation.  
As regards the notion of a liquidity trap, see Boianovsky (2004). Many studies 
concerning liquidity traps have been conducted, especially concerning Japan’s Heisei 
recession. For details on the occurrence of the liquidity trap, see Krugman, Dominquez, 
and Rogoff (1998); Krugman (2000); Svensson (2003); Hanes (2006); Sato (2008); and, 
Chow and Foster (2010). However, see also Hondroyiannis, Swanny, and Tavlas (2000). 
The liquidity trap mechanism has been discussed in static equilibrium models. Unlike 
these models, we consider a dynamic disequilibrium model. By incorporating a dynamic 
equation for expected income, we construct a modified version of the dynamic IS-LM 
model given by Torre (1977). See also Schinasi (1982), Owase (1991), and Lorenz 
(1993). Our model is called a modified dynamic IS-LM model. However, by assuming 
an unstable equilibrium, Torre’s study considers the possible occurrence of persistent 
fluctuations1 (i.e., business cycles) in the dynamic IS-LM model. Unlike these studies, 
this study considers the case where the equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable. 
     On the other hand, Romer (2000, 2013) considers a macroeconomic model in 
which a reaction function for the policy maker is incorporated. The model is called the 
IS-MP model. Through the same method used in constructing a modified dynamic 
IS-LM model, we construct a dynamic version of the IS-MP model.  
     In this study, we provide a new mechanism through which a monetary policy ends 
in failure. Such a mechanism results from the disequilibrium property and pessimism 
about the future economy2. Through the modified dynamic IS-LM and the dynamic 
                                                  
1 For business cycles, many models of the Keynesian type have been presented so far. By 
incorporating nonlinearity, each model proves the occurrence of a cycle. For such models, see 
Owase (1991) and Lorenz (1993). 
2 The essential idea in this study is based on Dohtani (2016a). However, unlike this study, by 
using an extended Goodwin model (see Owase (1991) and Lorenz (1993)), Dohtani (2016a) 
provides a mechanism that leads the economy to a persistent chronic stagnation in the case 
where economic agents possess the above-mentioned pessimistic outlook and a persistent 
fluctuation exists. Moreover, by using an extended Kaldor model (see Owase (1991) and Lorenz 
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version of the IS-MP models, we see that, even if the economy is not in a liquidity trap, 
it is possible that this pessimism causes monetary policy to fail and the economy falls 
into a situation similar to the liquidity trap. That is, for a long time, the economy does 
not recover from stagnation and falls into a quite low interest rate. Compared to the 
well-known mechanism concerning the ineffectiveness of monetary policy, the type of 
stagnation discussed in this study is more serious in the sense that for a long time the 
economic situation becomes worse than it was before the monetary policy was 
implemented. This study provides a simple and novel mechanism for how such an 
economic situation emerges. From this mechanism, we will extract further important 
information on the long stagnation accompanied by a quite low interest rate. 
This study analyzes modified dynamic IS-LM and dynamic IS-MP models, into 
which we incorporate two types of (intended or unintended) pessimism: pessimism in 
the initial condition (PIC), and a pessimistic mode embedded in the system (a 
pessimistic mode of behavior; abbreviated as PMES). For the dynamic models, we will 
see that the interaction between the two types of pessimism produces the long 
stagnation with the low interest rate.  
Our arguments may provide an explanation concerning the recent tendency for a 
long stagnation accompanied by a quite low interest rate, common in many leading 
industrialized nations. For more details on this tendency, see Summers (2014, 2015). 
Summers’s findings are called the “secular stagnation hypothesis.” Summers stressed 
that demand-side economics plays an important role in explaining this hypothesis. On 
the other hand, many important studies that explain it from a supply-side viewpoint 
have been conducted. See, for example, Gordon (2015, 2016). Like Summers (2014, 
2015), this study discusses the tendency from a demand-side viewpoint.  
On this point, we make one important remark. As stated above, the models we 
consider are globally asymptotically stable. In the dynamic analysis of such a model, 
even if there is no change in demand-side fundamentals such as investment and 
consumption functions, a long stagnation with a quite low interest rate results merely 
from both the two types of pessimism and the implementation of a monetary policy. 
From a comparative statics viewpoint, this result seems strange. However, we argue that 
the long stagnation emerges in the transition process from an old equilibrium to a new 
one. In this sense, our argument is essentially different from those that have attempted 
to theoretically explain long stagnation through equilibrium analysis. 
 
                                                                                                                                                  
(1993)), Dohtani (2016b) demonstrates that pessimistic and optimistic outlooks cause strange 
attractors. 
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2. IS-LM Model 
 
In this section, using an IS-LM model, we examine the effect of pessimism on an 
economic policy. Our model is created by incorporating expected income into a 
dynamic IS-LM model:  
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where y  is income, r  is the interest rate, and Iz  and Cz  are the expected incomes 
concerning investment and consumption. ),,( rzyI I  and ),( CzyC  are the investment 
and consumption functions, respectively. )( II zy   and )( CC zy   are the 
adjustment functions of the expected incomes. ),( ryL  is the money demand function; 
M  is the constant money supply; and,   and   are the adjustment coefficients for 
y  and r , respectively Throughout this study, for simplicity we assume that 
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where 1f  is the sum of propensities to invest and consume for income and 2f  is the 
sum of propensities to invest and consume for expected income. The function can 
be rewritten as 
 
.2/)(2/)()( 21 zyzyzyzyzy    
 
4 
 
Then, the system above becomes 
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Throughout this section, we set 
 
          ,42.01 f  ,48.02 f  ,65003 f  ,6100A ,2.11 L  ,11000B   
,98.32 L  ,3.0D  ,1  .00001.0   
 
We denote the system with these parameter values by ),,( 21  MLMIS . This section 
is based on  this situation.  
As stated in Introduction, we incorporate two types of pessimism: PMES and PIC. 
We start with the explanation of PMES. If many economic agents are largely pessimistic 
about the future economy and 0 zy , the agents are characterized by merely a weak 
hope of an upturn. Therefore, the adjustment for the expected income is small. On the 
other hand, if 0 zy  the agents are characterized by a strong anxiety of a downturn 
and, therefore, the adjustment for the expected income is large. Thus, we obtain that 1  
is large and 2  is small and, hence, 21   . For details, see Dohtani (2016a). With the 
last inequality in mind, we set )0001.0,4.0(),( 21  . Then, the adjustment function 
for the expected income is given by 
 
   .2/)(0001.02/)(4.0 zyzyzyzyz 

 
 
Figure 1 illustrates the two types of adjustment functions. The blue line represents the 
adjustment function with )2.0,2.0(),( 21   in a non-pessimistic case. On the other 
hand, the red, piecewise linear curve describes the adjustment function with 
)0001.0,4.0(),( 21   in the pessimistic case, which exhibits an asymmetry resulting 
from the pessimism concerning the future economy. The pessimism described by the red 
line is what was called PMES above, which implies that a source (or a mechanism) that 
creates pessimism is embedded in the model. Here, we make one important remark. For 
example, consider the case where 0 zy . PMES does not imply that the expected 
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state of the future economy is bad; it merely implies that the expected economic 
situation might not be worse, but not so much better than it is currently. Therefore, it is 
expected that PMES will make economic recovery difficult. 
 
Insert Figure 1 about here. 
 
We next explain PIC. Concerning the starting point of ))(),(( trty , we assume 
).0()0( zy   This is the type of pessimism called PIC, which implies that the economic 
situation we examine starts with an economic state composed of many agents with a 
pessimistic expectation about the future economy (i.e., with a low expected income). At 
this stage, we make one important remark. In the following, we consider the changes of 
parameters that do not affect both the old equilibrium before implementing the 
monetary policy and the new equilibrium after implementing it. 
In Figure 2, the downward-sloping blue curve represents the IS curve of System 
),,( 21  M
LMIS , which does not depend on ),( 21  . The dashed upward-sloping 
curve represents the LM curve of System ),,,40000( 21 
LMIS  which also does not 
depend on ),( 21  . We first assume that the economy stays in a sufficiently small 
neighborhood of the equilibrium point of System ).,,40000( 21  LMIS  Next, we 
assume that a monetary policy is implemented and the system becomes 
),,55000( 21 
LMIS . Throughout this study, we set 
 
              ,400001 M  .550002 M  
 
In the following, we consider the dynamic behavior of the systems with .2MM   The 
equilibria of the systems with 1MM   and 2MM   are called the old and the new 
equilibria, respectively The equilibrium of ),,( 21  MLMIS  is given as the 
intersection of the following curves. 
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Throughout this section, any dashed upward-sloping blue curve denotes the LM curve 
before implementing the monetary policy and any solid upward-sloping blue curve 
6 
 
denotes the LM curve after implementing the monetary policy. Moreover, in the 
following, any downward-sloping blue curve denotes the IS curve. 
 
Insert Figure 2 about here. 
 
Although we assume that many economic agents are characterized by PMES and 
PIC, to distinguish between the pessimistic and non-pessimistic cases, we begin by 
describing the dynamics of the non-pessimistic System )2.0,2.0,( 2M
LMIS  after 
implementing the monetary policy. In Figures 3 to 9, we set the initial value of the 
interest rate to 
 
.35.0)0( r  
 
The black curve in Figure 3 describes a typical path ])500,0[( t  of the 
non-pessimistic system. The starting point of the path is in a sufficiently small 
neighborhood of the old equilibrium point of System )2.0,2.0,( 1M
LMIS  before 
implementing the monetary policy. The figure shows that the path converges to the new 
equilibrium point of System )2.0,2.0,( 2M
LMIS .  
 
Insert Figure 3 about here. 
  
An important remark on Figure 3: We set the parameters to values at which the 
disequilibrium of the money market adjusts quickly but at which the disequilibrium of 
the good market adjusts slowly. This implies that the typical path quickly approaches 
the LM curve. We will set such parameter values in all the systems of this study. 
Therefore, the monetary policy temporarily causes the interest rate to decrease. We are 
interested in the analytical mechanism through which pessimism enlarges the degree of 
this decrease and keeps the interest rate quite low for a long time.  
We now consider the case where many economic agents are characterized by 
PMES and PIC. In the following, we numerically demonstrate that, under PIC and 
PMES, a monetary policy ends in failure. In Part 1 of Figure 4, the black curve is the 
same as that in Figure 3 and represents a typical path in the non-pessimistic case. The 
red curve in Part (1) represents a typical path ])500,0[( t  of System 
)0001.0,4.0,( 2M
LMIS  with PMES and PIC: 
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       .29700)0()0(38200  zy  
 
In Part (2) of Figure 4, the black and red curves represent the time series ])1500,0[( t  
of the incomes of the black and red paths in Part (1), respectively. The dashed and the 
solid green lines in Part (2) are the old and the new equilibria, respectively.  
     By comparing the black path in the non-pessimistic case with the red path in the 
pessimistic case, we demonstrate the failure of the monetary policy, in the sense that it 
takes a long time for the economy to recover to the original situation it was in before 
implementing the monetary policy. In other words, for a long time, the economic 
situation becomes worse than it was before the implementation of the monetary policy. 
Thus, a long stagnation emerges. This observation leads us to a new perspective 
concerning the failure of a monetary policy. Moreover, see Part (3) in Figure 4. Here, 
the red and black curves represent the time series ])50000,0[( t  of the red and black 
curves of Part (2), respectively. The dashed and solid green lines are the same as those 
in Part (2) of Figure 4. Part (3) of Figure 4 demonstrates that it requires a great deal of 
time for the monetary policy to become effective. 
     On the other hand, in Part (4) of Figure 4, the black and red curves describe the 
time series ])1500,0[( t  of interest rates of the black and red paths of Part (1), 
respectively. Part (4) of Figure 4 demonstrates that System )0001.0,4.0,( 2M
LMIS  
with PMES and PIC yields a sudden drop of interest rate and the quite low interest rate 
persists for a long time. Therefore, we see that the above-mentioned long stagnation is 
accompanied by a quite low interest rate. If the equilibrium GDP is interpreted as the 
potential GDP of Summers (2014, 2015), it is possible that the red path in Part (1) of 
Figure 4 may represent the economic situations presented in Summers (2014, 2015). 
 
Insert Figure 4 about here. 
 
      Here, we make an important remark: Recall that equilibria A and B in Part (1) 
of Figure 4 are globally asymptotically stable. From a comparative statics viewpoint, 
Part (1) simply describes the change from the old equilibrium (i.e., A) to the new, better 
equilibrium (i.e., B). Accordingly, if one only relies on comparative statics, our findings 
presented above are not detectable. 
 For the effect on the economic dynamics, we distinguish between the role played 
by PMES and that played by PIC. In  Figure 5, the brown and the purple curves in Part 
(1) represent typical paths ])100,0[( t of System )2.0,2.0,( 2MLMIS with 
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29700)0()0(38200  zy  (with PIC only) and System )0001.0,4.0,( 2MLMIS  
with )0()0(38200 zy   (with PMES only), respectively. The red curve in Part (1) of 
Figure 5 represents a typical path ])100,0[( t of System )0001.0,4.0,( 2MLMIS  
with 29700)0()0(38200  zy  (the case with both PIC and PMES). On the other 
hand, the dashed and the solid green curves in Part (2) of Figure 5 represent the old and 
the new equilibra, respectively. The red curve in Part (2) of Figure 5 represents the time 
series of the red path in Part (1) of Figure 5. The brown and purple curves in Part (2) of 
Figure 5 represent the time series ])100,0[( t  of incomes of the brown and purple 
paths in Part (1) of Figure 5, respectively. Moreover, the brown and purple curves in 
Part (3) of Figure 5 represent the time series ])100,0[( t  of the interest rates of the 
brown and purple paths in Part (1) of Figure 5, respectively. 
From the purple time series in Part (2) of Figure 5, we see that PIC plays the most 
important role in yielding an economic downturn. However, the purple time series also 
demonstrates that such a downturn is temporary. On the other hand, from the brown 
time series in Part (2) of Figure 5, we see that PMES plays the role of delaying the 
recovery. Consequently, the three time series in Part (2) of Figure 5 demonstrate that the 
interaction between PMES and PIC yields the long stagnation.  
On the other hand, from the purple time series in Part (3) of Figure 5, we see that 
PIC plays the most important role in yielding a sharp drop in the interest rate. However, 
the purple time series also demonstrates that such a downturn is temporary. On the other 
hand, the brown time series in Part (3) of Figure 5 demonstrates that PMES plays the 
role of hindering the upturn of the quite low interest rate. Consequently, like Part (2), 
the red time series in Part (3) of Figure 5 demonstrates that the interaction between 
PMES and PIC yields the long persistence of the quite low interest rate. Thus, Figure 5 
demonstrates that PMES and PIC yield the long stagnation accompanied by a quite low 
interest rate, shown as the red path in Part (1) of Figure 5. 
 
Insert Figure 5 about here. 
 
Here, we briefly demonstrate that the degree of economic downturn in the initial 
stage depends on the initial value of the expected income z(0) . Except for the values of 
z(0) , 1 , and 2 , we set the same parameter values as those used for Figure 4. The red 
curves in Parts (1) and (2) of Figure 6 represent typical paths ])1500,0[( t  of System 
)0100.0,4.0,( 2M
LMIS  with  38200)0( z  and 33000)0( z , respectively. The 
typical path of System )0100.0,4.0,( 2M
LMIS  with 29700)0( z  is given by the 
9 
 
red path in Part (1) of Figure 4. The red paths in Figure 6 and Part (1) of Figure 4 
demonstrate that, if PIC is sufficiently small, then, for a long time, the economic 
situation after the implementation of the monetary policy becomes worse than the 
economic situation before it.  
 
Insert Figure 6 about here. 
 
We see that the degree of failure of the monetary policy depends on 2 . Except 
for the values of 1  and 2 , we set the same parameter values as those used for the 
red path in Part (1) of Figure 4. The red curves in Figure 7 represent typical paths 
])1500,0[( t  of System ),4.0,( 22  MLMIS . In Parts (1) and (2) of Figure 7, we 
set 2.02   and 001.02  , respectively. The typical path of System 
),4.0,( 22  MLMIS  with 0001.02   is given by the red path in Part (1) of Figure 
4. The red paths in Figure 7 and in Part (1) of Figure 4 demonstrate that, as 2  
decreases, the degree of failure of the monetary policy decreases.   
 
Insert Figure 7 about here. 
 
On the other hand, we see that the degree of failure of the monetary policy does 
not depend on 1 . In Figure 8, except for the values of 1  and 2 , we set the same 
parameter values as those used for the red path in Part (1) of Figure 4. The red curves in 
Parts (1) and (2) of Figure 8 represent typical paths ])1500,0[( t  of System 
)0001.0,,( 12  MLMIS  with 01   and ,31   respectively. The red paths in 
Figure 8 show that the degree of failure of the monetary policy does not depend on 1 .  
 
Insert Figure 8 about here. 
 
Here, we make one important remark. From a comparative statics viewpoint, the 
relation between pessimism and stagnation has usually been argued through the 
occurrence of a liquidity trap or the changes of demand-side fundamentals, such as 
investment and consumption functions (for example, a change in the propensity to 
consume). Such changes may surely be important sources of a (long) stagnation. 
However, in this section, we demonstrate the following: Even in the case where the 
economy is not in a liquidity trap and there is no change in the fundamentals above, a 
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long stagnation accompanied by a quite low interest rate results from two types of 
pessimism. Our analysis is different from the comparative statics. The long stagnation 
we focus on emerges in the disequilibrium process (the transition process from an old 
equilibrium to a new one).  
 Finally, we consider the effects of 1f  and 2f  on the dynamics of System 
),,( 212  MLMIS
. As stated above, we consider the case where 1f  and 2f  have 
no effect on the equilibrium point. We define ]1,0[21  ffb . Since the IS curve is 
,/})1{( 3fAyb   as long as b  is constant, the equilibrium point remains unchanged. 
In the following, we set 
 
             9.0b (the propensity to invest)+(the propensity to consume) 
 
Then, we have ).9.0,(),( 1121 ffff   In the following, we consider the effect of 1f  
on the dynamic behavior. In Figure 9, except for the values of parameters 1f  and 
,9.0 12 ff  we set the same parameter values as those used for the red path in Part (1) 
of Figure 4. The red curves in Parts (1) and (2) of Figure 9 represent the typical paths of 
System )0001.0,4.0,( 2MLMIS  with ))0,9.0(),(( 21 ff  and 
)),2.0,7.0(),(( 21 ff  respectively. The red paths in Figure 9 and Part (1) of Figure 4 
demonstrate that as 2f  (the sum of propensities for expected income) increases with 
21 ffb   fixed, so does the degree of stagnation. Since our results are derived based 
on two types of pessimism concerning expected income, the result of Figure 9 is as 
expected. 
 
Insert Figure 9 about here. 
 
3. IS-MP Model 
 
In this section, by using the IS-MP model, we consider the effect of pessimism on 
the result of economic policy. Our model is obtained by incorporating expected income 
into the dynamic IS-MP model:  
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where )( ygr   is a reaction function representing the monetary policy rules. The 
reaction function is assumed to satisfy 0)(' yg  for any .0y  The IS-MP model is 
characterized by the reaction function. By inserting the reaction function in the 
differential equation concerning 

y , the dynamic IS-MP model corresponds to the 
following differential equations: 
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Here, we slightly modify System MP-IS  as follows: The equation )( ygr   
implies that the interest rate is adjusted without delay. However, such an assumption is 
unrealistic. Therefore, we assume that the adjustment takes time. To incorporate such a 
delay into System MP-IS , we rewrite the static equation )( ygr   as the dynamic 
equation )),(()( tygtr   where 0  denotes the delay for the adjustment. By 
using the mean-value theorem, we see that there is a ]1,0[  such that 
 
).()()()())((  

trtrtrtrtyg   
 
Throughout this section, we assume that the value of   is sufficiently small. Then the 
two time derivatives )( 

tr  and )(tr

 as approximately equal, that is, 
)()( trtr

 . Thus, if   is small, Thus, System MP-IS  becomes 
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Here, we define the following simple reaction function: 
 
            ,)(   yygr   ,0   
 
where the parameters   and   are determined by the policy maker. Throughout this 
section we set 
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,42.01 f  ,48.02 f  ,65003 f  ,7100A  .1  
 
We now demonstrate that our results hold true for System MPISdelay
 . It should be 
noted here that the equilibrium of System MPISdelay
  is the same as that of the dynamic 
IS-MP model MPIS , because the equilibrium points of both System MPISdelay
  and 
MPIS  are given by the intersection of the following curves: 
 
           IS curve: ,
1
33
21
f
A
y
f
ff
r 

   MP curve: ).( ygr   
 
In the following, we demonstrate that the same results as those in Section 2 can be 
derived. In this section, we begin with the situation where the policy maker changes the 
reaction function (or the policy rules) from  
 
42.0000015.0  yr  
 
to 
.65.0000014.0  yr   
 
Throughout this section, any dashed upward-sloping blue line denotes the MP curve 
before implementing the monetary policy, any solid upward-sloping blue line denotes 
the MP curve after implementing the monetary policy, and any solid downward-sloping 
blue curve denotes the IS curve. See Figure 10. 
 
Insert Figure 10 about here. 
 
We consider the effect of pessimism on the result of such a change in monetary 
rules. As in Section 2, we consider two types of pessimism: PIC and PMES. For Figure 
11, we set 
 
         ,000014.0  2.01  , ,49772)0( z  .32658.0)0( r  
 
The dashed and the solid green lines in Parts (2) and (3) represent the equilibria before 
and after implementing the monetary policy, respectively. The black curve in Part (1) of 
Figure 11 represents a typical path ])1500,0[( t  of System MPISdelay
  with 
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         2.021  , ,49772)0()0(  zy  ,32658.0)0( r  
 
where the starting point is in a sufficiently small neighborhood of the old equilibrium 
before implementing the monetary policy. The model economy with these parameter 
values is characterized by neither PMES nor PIC. On the other hand, for the red curve 
in Part (1) of Figure 11, we set 
 
         0001.04.0 21   , .41600)0()0(  zy  
 
The model economy with these parameter values is characterized by both PIC and 
PMES. The red curve in Part (1) represents the typical path ])1500,0[( t  of System 
MPIS
delay
  with these parameter values. 
The black and red curves in Part (2) of Figure 11 represent the time series 
])1500,0[( t  of the incomes of the black and red paths in Part (1) of Figure 11, 
respectively. As observed from the black path in Part (1) and the black time series in 
Part (2), in this case, the income in the model economy increases monotonously and 
rapidly approaches the new equilibrium after the implementation of the monetary policy. 
On the other hand, as observed from the red path in Part (1) and the red time series in 
Part (2), the income in the model economy in this case rapidly decreases at first and the 
recovery from this slump occurs extremely late. Thus, like the argument concerning 
System LM-IS , by comparing the black time series in the non-pessimistic case with 
the red time series in the pessimistic case, we see that even the return to the initial state 
of income takes a great deal of time.  
The mechanism for the dynamic behavior of the red time series in Part (2) of 
Figure 11 is the same as that for the red time series in Part (2) of Figure 4. Here, we 
briefly explain it. See Parts (3), (4) and (5) of Figure 11. For these parts, we set  
 
,000014.0  .49772)0( y   
 
For the purple path ])1500,0[( t  in Part (3) of Figure 11, we set 
 
         ,2.021   .41600)0()0(  zy  
 
On the other hand, for the brown path ])1500,0[( t  in Part (3) of Figure 11, we set  
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,0001.04.0 21    .49772)0()0(  zy  
 
Unlike the case of the purple path, for the brown path the model economy is 
characterized by PMES only. For the purple path ])1500,0[( t , the model economy is 
characterized by PIC only. Moreover, the red, purple, and brown curves in Part (4) of 
Figure 11 represent the time series ])100,0[( t  of the income of the red, purple, and 
brown paths in Part (3) of Figure 11, respectively. Moreover, the dashed and the solid 
green vertical lines in Part (4) represent the equilibria before and after implementing the 
monetary policy, respectively.  
     The purple path in Part (3) and the purple time series in Part (4) show that the 
income of the model economy decreases at first but rapidly approaches the new 
equilibrium after the implementation of the monetary policy. Moreover, the brown path 
in Part (3) and the brown time series in Part (4) show that, although the income of the 
model economy does not decrease, the approach to the new equilibrium is very slow.  
     On the other hand, in the red path in Part (3) (the same as that in Part (1) of Figure 
11), the model economy is characterized by both PIC and PMES: 
,0001.04.0 21    .41600)0()0(  zy  Therefore, the dynamics of the red path 
are a mixture of the dynamics of the purple and brown paths. Therefore, the red time 
series in Part (4) demonstrates that, in the case where the economic agents are 
characterized by PIC and PMES, the monetary policy produces an economic stagnation 
stemming from both the decrease caused by PIC and the difficulty in recovery caused 
by PMES. The stagnation is serious in the sense that even the return to the initial state of 
the income is difficult. 
Moreover, the red, purple, and brown curves in Part (5) of Figure 11 represent the 
time series ])100,0[( t  of the interest rates of the red, purple, and brown paths in Part 
(3) of Figure 11, respectively. Thus, for the System MPISdelay
 , Part (5) suggests that, in 
the case where the economic agents are pessimistic through both PIC and PMES, PIC 
increases the degree of decrease in the interest rate and PMES keeps the interest rate 
quite low for a long time. Thus, the monetary policy produces the long duration of the 
quite low interest rate.  
 
Insert Figure 11 about here. 
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    Thus, for System MPISdelay
 , we obtain the same results as those for the dynamic 
IS-LM model. Especially in the sense that, for a long time, the economic situation 
becomes worse than before the implementation of the monetary policy and is 
accompanied by a quite low interest rate, there is a possibility that the monetary policy 
fails in an economic situation characterized by PIC and PMES. Thus, the observation in 
this section also leads us to a new perspective concerning the failure of a monetary 
policy. Like Part (1) of Figure 4, the red path in Part (1) Figure 11 may also represent 
the secular stagnation accompanied by a quite low interest rate, presented in Summers 
(2014, 2015). 
 
3. Conclusions and Final Remarks 
 
    In this study, we examined the effect of pessimism about the future economy on 
the result of a monetary policy. We first used the dynamic version of the IS-LM model 
with an adaptive adjustment of expected income, into which we incorporated two types 
of pessimism: PIC and PMES. We demonstrated that PIC temporarily makes the 
economic situation worse than before the implementation of the monetary policy. On 
the other hand, we demonstrated that PMES makes the adjustment coefficient small in 
the positive domain and large in the negative domain. Subsequently, the adjustment 
coefficient becomes small, especially in the upswing. Consequently, PMES makes the 
upturn difficult. Thus, we demonstrated that, if a monetary policy is implemented in an 
economic situation characterized by PIC and PMES, then, through the interaction 
between PIC and PMES, for a long time, the interest rate is quite lower than before 
implementing the monetary policy and the economic situation keeps being worse than 
before the monetary policy. 
     The intuitive explanation is as follows: We assumed that the disequilibrium of the 
money market adjusts quickly but that of the good market adjusts slowly. Moreover, we 
assumed that the equilibrium point is globally asymptotically stable. In an economic 
situation with PMES and PIC, a monetary policy is implemented, which creates a new, 
economically good equilibrium. However, the good equilibrium is not attained for a 
long time. The intuitive reason behind this is as follows: First, PIC temporarily makes 
the economic situation worse than before the implementation of the monetary policy. 
Because of the quick adjustment of the monetary market and the slow adjustment of the 
good market, the path of the model economy quickly approaches the LM curve. As 
shown in the figures of Section 2, depending on the position and the form of the LM 
16 
 
curve, it is possible that such a path quickly approaches a quite low part of the LM 
curve. Consequently, compared to the economic situation before implementing the 
monetary policy, PIC temporarily produces a worse economic situation, accompanied 
by a quite low interest rate. On the other hand, PMES hinders (or decelerates quite 
substantially) the recovery from the worse situation and causes the quite low interest 
rate to persist for a long time. Thus, as a result of the interaction between PIC and 
PMES, the quite low interest rate and stagnation coexist for a long time.  
Such a dynamic situation is serious and important, in the sense that the economic 
situation becomes worse than before implementing the monetary policy. This 
observation leads us to a new perspective on the failure of a monetary policy: that a 
serious economic situation may be caused by a monetary policy. Moreover, through 
such dynamics, confidence in the government may be lost and, therefore, the economic 
agents may become more pessimistic. As a result, the economy may fall into a longer 
stagnation. Such a situation may explain the recent tendency for a long stagnation with a 
quite low interest, which may be a pathological phenomenon in many leading 
industrialized nations. Like Summers (2014), we discussed the tendency from a 
viewpoint of demand-side. However, unlike Summers, we stressed that the stagnation 
emerges in the disequilibrium transition process from an old equilibrium to a new 
equilibrium produced by a monetary policy.  
    We also considered the effects of parameters on the results of a monetary policy. 
We demonstrated that, as the adjustment coefficient in the positive domain becomes 
small, the degree of failure of a monetary policy increases. On the other hand, we 
demonstrated that the adjustment coefficient in the negative domain has no effect on the 
results of a monetary policy. We also observed that, as the initial value of expected 
income decreases, the degree of failure of a monetary policy increases. Moreover, we 
observed that, as the propensity to consume for the expected income increases, the 
degree of stagnation becomes large, although this is an expected result. 
     We also considered the IS-MP model by Romer (2000, 2013). By considering the 
delay in the adjustment of the interest rate, we constructed a dynamic version of the 
IS-MP model with an adaptive adjustment for expected income, into which the same 
pessimisms as above are incorporated. We showed that the same results as above hold 
true for the dynamic version.  
     Here, we make four remarks. First, psychological phenomena may often be easy 
to change. However, the low economic situation we described dynamically implies a 
self-fulfilling prophecy3 because such an economic situation emerges from PIC and 
                                                  
3 For this notion, see Merton (1948).  
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PMES that are based on a pessimistic expectation about the future economy. 
Consequently, such a low situation persists or becomes even more serious.  
Second, if once the economy falls into the long stagnation described in this study, 
then, as long as two types of pessimism are not removed, any monetary policy to raise 
the economy from long stagnation will make the economic situation worse and worse. 
Considering the effect of the self-fulfilling prophecy, two types of pessimism may be 
reinforced and the economic condition may become more serious.  
Third, such a long stagnation with a quite low interest rate, as we discussed in this 
study, can occur, even if no problem appears from a comparative statics viewpoint. In 
our model, the economy does not fall into a liquidity trap and there is no change in 
demand-side fundamentals (such as investment and consumption functions) and the 
equilibrium is globally asymptotically stable. Regardless of such an economic situation, 
our model produces the long stagnation. The reason is that the stagnation emerges in the 
(disequilibrium) transition process from the old equilibrium to the new one. In other 
words, we would not be able to recognize such a type of stagnation through any 
equilibrium analysis. 
Fourth, in the case where such a type of stagnation emerges, any economic 
analysis that uses the long-run (aggregate demand)-(aggregate supply) model, becomes 
invalid, because the aggregate demand curve itself does not exist. Thus, we must 
construct a higher-dimensional long-run model, in which a short-run disequilibrium 
persists. Even if such an extended model is constructed, it contains the disequilibrium 
goods and money markets. Moreover, the sources (PIC and PMES) of such a type of 
long stagnation are quite simple. Therefore, it is also much expected that the same 
arguments as those in this study hold true for a higher-dimensional long-run model. 
Thus, our results can be rather robust.  
     From the third and fourth remarks, we see that our result leads us to a new 
perspective on the source of a long stagnation and, moreover, on the failure of monetary 
policy in the sense that a monetary policy makes the economic situation worse than 
before the implementation of a policy. Thus, we must stress that, from a viewpoint of 
policy (especially, monetary policy) to avoid the long stagnation yielded by PMES and 
PIC, the policy maker should prudentially consider both the timing and the economic 
conditions when implementing a monetary policy. 
     We believe that the findings by Hansen (1939) and Summers (2014, 2015) show 
the importance of the viewpoint of disequilibrium. On the other hand, we must also 
stress that from a theoretical viewpoint the policy maker should pay attention to many 
important results derived through disequilibrium analysis, which have often been 
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neglected.  
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Figure Captions 
    
Figure 1. The blue line is the non-pessimistic adjustment function with 
).2.0,2.0(),( 21   The red curve is the pessimistic adjustment function with 
).0001.0,4.0(),( 21   
“ 
 
Figure 2. The downward-sloping line is the IS curve. The dashed (solid) 
upward-sloping curve is the LM curve with 1M  ( 2M ) before (after) implementing the 
policy.   
 
 
Figure 3. Typical path in the non-pessimistic case. 
 
 
Figure 4. (1) The black curve is the same as that in Figure 3 and the red curve is a path 
in the pessimistic case. Point A (B) is the old (new) equilibrium.  
(2) The black and red curves are time series of incomes of the paths in Part (1). The 
dashed (solid) green line represents the old (new) equilibrium.  
(3) Time series in Part (2) with ].50000,0[t   
(4) Time series of interest rates of the paths in Part (1). 
 
 
Figure 5. (1) The brown (purple) curve is the path of LMIS  with PMES only (PIC 
only). The red curve is the path of LMIS  with both PMES and PIC.  
(2) The brown, purple, and red curves are time series of incomes of the paths in Part (1), 
respectively. The dashed (solid) green line represents the old (new) equilibrium. 
(3) Time series of interest rates of the paths in Part (1). 
 
 
Figure 6. (1) Path with .38200)0( z   
(2) Path with .33000)0( z  
 
 
Figure 7. (1) Path with .2.02    
(2) Path with .001.02   
 
 
Figure 8. (1) Path with .01   (2) Path with .31   
 
 
Figure 9. (1) Path with )).0,9.0(),(( 21 ff  (2) Path with )).2.0,7.0(),(( 21 ff  
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Figure 10. The downward-sloping line is the IS curve. The dashed (solid) 
upward-sloping curve is the MP curve before (after) implementing the policy.  
 
 
Figure 11. (1) The black (red) curve is the path in the non-pessimistic (pessimistic) case. 
The red curve is the path of MPISdelay
  with both PMES and PIC.  
(2) The black and red curves are time series of income of the paths Part (1). The dashed 
(solid) green line represents the old (new) equilibrium. 
(3) The brown (purple) curve is the path of MPISdelay
  with PMES only (with PIC only). 
The red curve is the path of MPISdelay
  with both PMES and PIC.  
(4) The brown, purple, and red curves are time series of incomes of the paths in Part (3). 
The dashed (solid) green line represents the old (new) equilibrium.  
(5) Time series of interest rates of the paths in Part (3). 
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